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MAHAYANA BUDDHIST MEDITATION: Theory and Practice. Minoru 
Kiyota(ecL), The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1978. xv + 313 pp.
This volume in memory of Richard Robinson (1926-1970) was originally 
scheduled for publication in 1973. Kajiyama explains in a note that due to the 
fact that his paper was written in 1972 he has been unable to incorporate the 
results of research done by other scholars in recent years. If this applies also 
to the other papers this has to be taken into account by the reader of this volume.
Of the nine articles in this volume only very few can be recommended without 
any reservations. Gadjin M. Nagao (‘ “What Remains” in Sunyata: A Yogacara 
Interpretation of Emptiness,’ pp. 66-82) examines the Yogacara interpretation 
of a passage of the Culasufifiata-sutta according to which “ ‘emptiness’ is 
nonbeing on one hand but that there is, on the other, something remaining 
therein which, being reality, cannot be negated.” This passage is quoted in 
Vasubandhu’s Madhyantavibhaga-bhajya, the Bodhisattvabhumi, Asanga’s 
Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Hsien-yang-sh6ng-chiao-lun. Nagao points 
out that the Lankavatara-sutra seems to quote from a Sanskrit version of the 
Cujasufifiata-sutta. The existence of a Sanskrit version is indeed very probable 
because the Tibetan Kanjur contains a translation of a Sunyata-nama mahasutra 
(Otam Kanjur Catalogue no. 956) which corresponds to the Pali text. The same 
passage of the Cujasufifiata-sutta is also quoted in the Ratnagotravibhaga but, 
as Nagao explains, in this text it is not interpreted in the same way as in the 
Yogacara treatises. Nagao’s article is an expanded and corrected version of 
an article published by him in 1968 in the Indogaku Bukkydgaku kenkyii (vol. 
xvi, pp. 497-501). The Cujasufifiata-sutta and its treatment in Yogacara and 
Tathagatagarbha texts has been studied also in great depth by David Seyfort 
Ruegg in his La thdorig du Tathdgaiagarbha et du Gotra (Paris, 1969), pp. 319 ff.
Likewise important is Yuichi Kajiyama’s ‘Later Madhyamikas on Episte­
mology and Meditation’ (pp. 114-143) in which he analyses §antarak$ita*s 
Madhyamakalaqikara. Kajiyama shows that the epistemological stages 
distinguished by Santarakgita are also found in the first Bhavanakrama written 
by §&ntarak?ita’s disciple, Kamalafila. He translates some important passages 
of this text which explains how in the course of meditation different philosoph­
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ical systems are investigated. His explanations of the differences between the 
epistemological theories of the Sarvastivadins, the Sautrantikas, the Satya- 
karavada-yogacarins, the Alikakaravada-Yogacarins and the Madhyamikas 
are precise and lucid. His article is a very welcome contribution to the study of 
the Later Madhyamikas who have greatly influenced Buddhist philosophy in 
Tibet.
Western scholars have paid little attention to the Hua-yen school. Francis 
H. Cook translates Fa-tsang’s commentary on the Praj fl Sparami tahrdayasutra 
(Taisho no. 1712), pp. 167-206. His introduction analyses Fa-tsang’s under­
standing of the doctrine of emptiness and discusses his teachings on meditation. 
As to the doctrine of emptiness, Francis Cook believes that the Hua-yen under­
standing of this doctrine does not distort its original meaning according to the 
Madhyamika school. He remarks that peculiarly Chinese is its emphasis on the 
phenomenal shih * and its appreciation of the harmony of the universe. 
Cook’s translation is carefully done and calls for very few observations. In one 
important passage he has been misled by a mispunctuation in the Taisho text. 
Cook translates: “Because form and emptiness are not two different things, 
the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are neither exterminated nor achieved, 
and this is the practice without an abiding place” (p. 192). One must read 
“the thoughts of wisdom and compassion are not 
different and this constitutes the practice without an abiding place.” Shih-hui’s 
commentary (Taisho no. 1713, p. 564C4-9) to which Cook refers on p. 181 of 
his article shows clearly how this sentence has to be analysed and explained. 
Also in a few other passages a different interpretation seems preferable. On 
p. 187 Cook has: “Because the heart [of the teaching] is not revealed suddenly, 
there is first a brief statement of the situation. Since it does not abbreviate 
what it is able to present there follows an extended explanation.”
Cook misunderstood the meaning of A: “Since a brief statement cannot be 
complete, there follows an extended explanation.” On p. 188 Cook translates 
ft with ‘beings’: “He also gets his name from contemplating beings and going 
to aid them freely.” Chi is “the right opportunity” (cf. Nakamura’s Bukkyogo 
daijiten, p. 213b: hazumi, kikkake, ori). In the section on absolute Nirvapa 
(p. x99) Cook translates: “There is an allusion to a different [type of nirvapa] 
which is the small-vehicle apparitional city [in the Lotus Su/ra] which is estab­
lished as a provisional device” ffift means “to distinguish
from”: “[The absolute Nirvapa] is distinguished from the small-vehicle, etc.”
It is difficult to be very enthusiastic about the remaining six articles. Elvin 
W. Jones has contributed a long article entitled ‘Buddhist Theories of Existents: 
The Systems of Two Truths’ (pp. 3-45). The first part of it traces the develop­
ment of philosophical speculations about the nature of reality in ancient 
Greece, in pre-Buddhist India and in the different Buddhist systems. The 
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second part is based on the Tibetan siddhdnta literature and the works of Tson 
kha pa. According to the author “To attempt to reconstruct the thought of 
Nagaijuna set forth in the Karikas and other treatises without the writings of 
Tson kha pa would probably be as thankless a task as to attempt to reconstruct 
the metaphysics of Aristotle without the works of Thomas Aquinas” (p. 38). 
This is an astounding statement. Thomas Aquinas had no access to the Greek 
texts of Aristotle’s works which he knew only from Latin translations from the 
Greek original or from the Arabic. Moreover, in common with other scholars 
of his time he accepted as genuine works which had been wrongly attributed 
to Aristotle. Tson kha pa and the Tibetan authors of Grub mtha’s were better 
informed about Indian Buddhist philosophy than Thomas Aquinas was with 
regard to the philosophy of Aristotle. It is certainly very instructive to study the 
works of Tson kha pa and the Grub mtha’s but this requires a very good knowl­
edge of Indian Buddhist texts in the Sanskrit original and in Tibetan transla­
tion. Elvin W. Jones seems to consider it superfluous to consult original Sanskrit 
texts with the inevitable consequence of obscuring the meaning of passages 
quoted by him. For instance, on p. 32 he translates a passage from the first 
Bhavanakrama: yasmdd yad adoayalakfa^am [JAimwn] advayavadindiji freftharfi 
paramdr thenabhimalarfi tad api nirdtmakarji mhsvabhdvam advayanirdbhdsena jUdnena 
paiyati yogi. Jones translates: “Thus, that understanding of nonduality which 
is held by the consciousness doctrine [Vijftinavada] as the highest truth is 
empty, and by the wisdom of the unmanifest [nirabha$a (sic!)] the yogin comes 
to see this nonduality as ultimately unreal.” One wonders what a non-informed 
reader can make out of this ‘wisdom of the unmanifest.’ The same passage has 
been translated by Kajiyama in his article (p. 140) in which he explains clearly 
the meaning of adEayanirabhdsaiji jiianam. One must add that a rather random 
collection of quotations from a great number of texts, even if correctly translated, 
is not the best way to explain difficult philosophical notions.
The same preference for Tibetan commentaries can be found in an article by 
Charlene McDermott on ‘Yogic Direct Awareness as Means of Valid Cognition 
in Dharmakirti and Rgyal-tshab’ (pp. 144-166). The author is inspired 
by Richard Robinson’s remarks on “Tibet’s rich contribution to world cultural 
ecology.” Charlene McDermott’s article is of little help in understanding 
Rgyal-tshab’s commentary, of which only very few passages are quoted. As an 
example of her interpretation of Rgyal-tshab (his work is not at my disposal) 
it is sufficient to quote one passage: slob dpon chos mchog gi gsung nos. lhang tsher 
gyis bar du chad pa bzhin du. sgom bya'i don mthong ba de ni rab kyi mtha'i gnas skabs 
yin la. lag mthil du she (sic) sgong bzhag pa bzhin du mthong ba ni mngon sum yin no 
zhes gsung ngo (cf. n. 43). The author translates: “According to what is said by 
the teacher Dharmottara, [at first it is] as if [one’s view] were obstructed by 
[a cloud] of mica; in the state [or condition] approaching the extreme limits, 
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one envisions the object of concentrated contemplation as if it were an dmalaka 
situated in the palm of one’s hand” (p. 152). Rgyal-tshab abridges the following 
passage from Dharmottara’s commentary (cf. Nyayabindu, Tib. tr., Bibliothoca 
Buddhica, vol. vm, pp. 27.16-28.1: gang gi tsho lhang tshor gyis bar du chad 
pa bzhin du bsgom par bya ba’i don mthong do ni rab kyi mtha'i gnas skabs yin zhing 
lag mthil du shol sgong bzhag pa bzhin du bsgoms pa’i don mthong ba gang yin pa do 
ni mal ’byor pa’i mngon sum yin no (for the Sanskrit text see Nyayabindu, 
Bibliothoca Buddhica, vol. vu, p. 12.1-3). The underlined words are omitted 
by Rgyal-tshab. However, it is difficult to admit that mal 'byor pa’i is missing in 
Rgyal-tshab’s text. Dharmottara distinguishes three stages. In the first stage 
of intense meditation (bhdvandprakar$a) the vision begins to be clear; in the 
second stage in which the intense meditation reaches its limit (prakar$a- 
paryantavastha) the object is seen as it were separated by mica (Skt. abhraka\ 
Tib. lhang tshor). In the third the object is seen as an dmalaka grain placed in 
the palm of one’s hand. The third stage is the yogipratyak/a. The passage 
translated by Charlene McDermott refers to the second and third stage: 
“According to what is said by the teacher Dharmottara: The vision of the 
meditated object as separated by mica is the state in which the intense [medita­
tion] reaches its limit. The vision [of the object] as an dmalaka placed in the 
palm of the hand is the [yogi]-pratyakfa.” Stcherbatsky translated abhraka by 
*a thin cloud.’ This accounts probably for the ‘[a cloud] of mica’ in her trans­
lation which combines Stcherbatsky’s translation with the meaning of Tibetan 
lhang-lshor (cf. Chos-grags’s Tibetan dictionary). If she had consulted the 
Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Dharmottara’s commentary, she would have 
seen that the dot after bzhin du has to be omitted. This article shows again that 
the study of Tibetan works can lead to fatal consequences if not sufficient 
attention is given to the basic texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan.
The less said about Stefan Anacker’s ‘The Meditational Therapy of the 
Madhyantavibhagabhajya’ (pp. 83-113), probably the better. He ‘translates’ 
chapters 2, 4 and part of 5 of the Madhyantavibhagabha$ya. A few examples 
may suffice to show how fully unprepared the translator was for his task. 
P. 94: “Leading towards the view of self, obstructing insights regarding 
this and external objects, the extinction of suffering, the Path, the Gems, 
others* attainments and being satisfied with little” (satkdyadfffes taduastuno 'pi 
callnirodhamargaratnofu l&bhasatkdra ova ca/samlekhasya parijUdno'). P. 95: “The 
fetter of envy is an obstruction to satisfaction in others’ attainments, because 
it wishes to see only others’ faults” (irjydsamyojanam lAbhasalkdraparijUdno 
taddofddarsands'). P. 96: “To welfare arises the lack of means to rouse oneself 
from inactivity, lack of complete use of one’s sense fields, and careless activity” 
(kusalasya trfyy dvarapdni/aprayogo ’ndyatanaprayogo ’yoniiafiprayogai ca). There is 
little point in trying to correct these and other nonsensical translations. For 
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an excellent translation of the entire Madhyantavibhagabhajya the reader 
may be referred to Nagao’s translation published in 1976 in volume 15 of the 
Daijd button (pp. 215-358, 380-409).
In ‘Samathavipafyanayuganaddha: The Two Leading Principles of Buddhist 
Meditation' (pp. 46-65), Gcshe Sopa presents a general overview of Buddhist 
meditative practice. It is of course impossible in such a brief compass to give 
a clear and precise description of the meditative practices as described in the 
texts mentioned in the final note. The understanding of this complicated topic 
is not promoted by the translation of technical terms which are clearly based 
upon Tibetan renderings of Sanskrit terms. For instance, the author translates 
rtirvedhabhagiya with “the approximations to the definitive separation." In 
Tibetan nirvedha is rendered by nts-par 'byed-pa but the meaning of nirvedha is 
definite insight (micito vedhah), cf. AbhidharmakoSa (cd. Pradhan), p. 386.3. 
The author even creates such words as ndbhisamskdra (pp. 47 and 48) and 
translates maula with ‘mastery’ (p. 54).
Minoru Kiyota’s ‘Buddhist Devotional Meditation: A Study of the 
Sukhavativyuhdpade4a’ (pp. 249-296) contains an analysis and translation of 
the Sukhavativyuhdpade^a attributed to Vasubandhu. In his introduction 
Kiyota discusses the attribution of the text to Vasubandhu and points out 
that this was accepted by Yamaguchi. Although he mentions several of his 
publications he does not mention Yamaguchi’s Stshin no jbdoron (Kyoto, 1963) 
which contains a detailed explanation of the SukhavativyuhopadeSa. Kiyota 
declares that the issue of whether this text is a composition by Vasubandhu or 
a Chinese pseudepigraphon is not a crucial issue. According to him the crucial 
issue is that it is a Mahayana text (p. 273). Certainly nobody disputes the 
Mahayana character of this text. However, whether the text was composed in 
India or in China is of very great importance for the history of Buddhism in 
India and China. Kiyota’s translation is in general adequate but suffers from 
being often too loose and imprecise. For instance, a very important passage 
mentions the ‘sameness dharma-body* but is not translated by
Kiyota (cf. p. 284). This crucial term is not mentioned at all in the notes 
although Kiyota does not hesitate to give some very elementary information 
(sometimes rather curiously worded; for instance: n. 41, “Bhagavat (ric) = 
Bhagavan, meaning the glorious, divine, adorable, venerable. It refers to the 
Buddha"). Kiyota’s translation of this passage (Taisho vol. 26, p. 232b 1-3) 
is not only incorrect but also incomplete. He omits part of a phrase
which is found in the Taisho edition used by him (cf n. 3) but omitted in 
other editions (for instance, Yamaguchi Susumu, op. cit.f pp. 200-201). The 
entire passage together with the explanations given by T’an-luan is translated 
on p. 275 of the Hfibdgirin (fasc. 3, Paris, 1937). The Hdbigirin explains that 
“byddd hosshin Corps d’Essence d’Egalitd, ddsigne soit un des Corps 
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de Buddha correspondant A une des Terres de Bodhisattvas, soit plus sp6- 
cialement dans la secte J6do, le Corps que revfctent les Bodhisattvas dis la 8e 
Terre, et que peuvent mime revitir, par la gr&ce opirante du Buddha Ami da, 
les Bodhisattvas des Terres infirieures.”
Leon Hurvitz has contributed an article entitled ‘Fa-shcng’s Observations 
on the Four Stations of Mindfulness’ (pp. 207-248). Fa-sheng (Dharmairi?) 
is the author of a text consisting of 250 verses and a prose commentary (Taisho 
no. 1550). The Chinese title is A-p'i-t'an hsin lun (Abhidharmahrdayatastra or 
AbhidharmasaraAastra?). A second version of this text contains the same 
verses with a prose commentary by Upa^anta (Taisho no. 1551). A third 
version, due to Dharmatrata, adds 350 verses to the original 250 verses and 
contains a more detailed prose commentary (Taisho no. 1552). The four 
smjtyupaslhanas are discussed by Dharma^ri in the beginning of chapter 5. 
This is a very brief passage of three verses with a short prose commentary 
(Taishd vol. 28, 8i8a-b). This passage is not very noteworthy and it is not made 
clear by Hurvitz why he has selected it for such extensive treatment. Although 
Hurvitz states that the core text of his study will be Dharmatai’s text, he also 
paraphrases or translates the corresponding passages of the two other texts 
(11 and m). Hurvitz begins by quoting the first verse of chapter 5 of m 
without indicating that this verse is found in m only but not in 1 and n. 
Hurvitz would have greatly facilitated a better understanding of the contents 
of the corresponding passages of these three texts if he had indicated the 
considerable differences between 1 and the two other texts, which incorporate 
several topics not treated in I.1 After translating and commenting upon the 
first verse of chapter 5 of ra Hurvitz quotes the Sanskrit text and de La Vallie 
Poussin’s translation of Koia vi. I4cd (i5cd in Gokhale’s edition of the karikas, 
but i4cd in Pradhan’s edition of the Abhidharmakotabhajya): ktyamccit- 
tadharma^dj]i duilakfanaparik^andt. This is followed by a translation of Vyakhya 
p. 529.2-15 in which Hurvitz demonstrates once more his very poor knowledge 
of Sanskrit. For instance, prajH&m amtarena “without knowledge” is rendered by 
“this side of wisdom,” jfidnauadhydh klesd iti “the passions are to be killed by 
knowledge” by “the defilements are the killers of gnosis.” Yatamitra explains 
that by the dharmas mentioned in vi. 14 the dharmas other than kaya, vedand 
and citta are meant, and not all dharmas collectively: dharmds tribhyo 'nya iti 
asaifibhinnavyauasthdm abhisarnd/idyaivam ucyate “the ‘dharmas other than the 
three’ is used in view of their non-mixed state (i.e., they are distinguished from 
kdya, uedand and citta)” Hurvitz’s translation says exactly the opposite: “The 
expression ‘the dharmas other than the three* is used by naming them col-
1 Cf. Jos^ van den Broeck, La saveur de CimnutrUl (A-p'i-t'an Kan LuWei Lun), Louvain- 
la-Neuve (1977), pp- 68-69.
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lectively, without distinguishing the latter one from another?* Yaiomitra 
continues by explaining that when the dharmas are mentioned collectively 
they include the body, etc. and all composed and non-composed dharmas: 
sarjibhinnavyacasthdydrji tu kdyddayo 'pi nigjhyarjtU. punap sarve sarjiskfid asarjiskjids ca 
dharma draft atyah “However, in the mixed state (i.e., when the dharmas are 
mentioned collectively), the body, etc. are also included. Moreover, all dharmas, 
composed and non-composed, have (then) to be considered (as included).** 
Hurvitz translates: “In case a distinction were made, they would be specified 
as ‘body, etc? Then all dharmas, constituted and unconstituted, are to be 
[so?] viewed?* On pp. 231 and 233 Hurvitz translates two other passages of the 
Vyakhya and again makes some elementary mistakes.
In the following pages (pp. 221-229) Hurvitz translates several suttas from 
the forty-seventh section of the Saipyuttanikaya and the corresponding texts 
from the Chinese Agamas. His translation of the first verse of chapter v of 1 
is to be found on p. 229:
In this way the Sage severs His labors
And his multitudinous fears. The basis [of the severance]
And the like, the right knowledge [cheng chih representing
samyagjUdna ?]
[which is] the expedient means [thereto],
I will now tell. Listen well!
Hurvitz adds that “certain syntactic liberties had to be taken in order to 
preserve the order of the verses?’
The text translated by Hurvitz is as follows:
In >975 Charles Willemen published a translation of the Abhidharmahfdaya: 
The Essence of Metaphysics; Abhidharmahjdaya (Bruxelles). His translation is as 
follows:
Thus the noble eliminate hardship, the root of all fear. The right 
knowledge of the preparatory applications will now be explained. 
Listen well!
Willemen adds in a note: satji9 Q prayoga However, translates
certainly samyaguydy&na. This is confirmed by the fact that the term is
found in u (p. 848624). In Chinese is used to render both sam- and sarnyak. 
Hurvitz’s translation of it by ‘the like’ makes complete nonsense of the verse. 
It would be a waste of time and energy to point out all the mistakes committed 
by Hurvitz in his translations of the beginning of chapter 5 in the three texts 1, 
»59
THE EA8TERN BUDDHIST
n and in. His carelessness is well shown by the fact that he overlooked com­
pletely a variant on p. 818a (note 5). The Taisho text has $ JJ'fili-il'ESSIE 
One must of course read jfltlh: “the applications of mindfulness to the body, 
to feeling, to thought, and to the dharmas are thus produced one after another” 
(Willemen, p. 68). Hurvitz translates: “The meanings of the said body, sensa­
tions, thought, and dharma shall now be brought forth in due order.”
In translating such sometimes difficult Abhidharma texts a good knowledge 
of Chinese is far from sufficient. It is necessary to know well the technical 
terminology in both Sanskrit and Chinese in order to prevent misunderstandings. 
It is a particularly delicate task to trace the original Sanskrit terms. Hurvitz 
does not hesitate to reconstruct even entire phrases. His reconstructions of terms 
and phrases are often far from the mark. For instance, on p. 2og Hurvitz states 
that may represent myatabhagakuSalamuldni. This Chinese expression
undoubtedly renders nirvedhabhdgiydni kusalamuldni. Hurvitz is not aware of the 
fact that the same Chinese expression can be used to render different Sanskrit 
terms. In the texts translated by him renders both yydydma (see above) 
and prayoga (cf. Willemen, p. 229, n. 12). Hurvitz always translates it by updya 
(expedient means, device).
Although Hurvitz has made much use of de La Vall6e Poussin’s translation 
of the KoSa, he has failed to see that the threefold contemplation (of asubhd, 
dndpdna, and dhdtu) is taught to the following three categories of men: the 
(cf. lvp, Koia vi, p. 149), the vitarkacarita (ibid.) and the dr/jicarita 
(lvp, Koda iv. p. 174, n. 6). In in (p. 9o8b3) the text has Hurvitz
translates “he who is driven about by (false) views” which, according to him 
may stand for:yo df/jibhif cdryate (p. 234 and note 18)!
The smrtyupasthdnas are treated also in chapter 31 of the Ta Mi tu lun (cf. 
Etienne Lamotte, Lt Traiti de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, in, Louvain, 1970, 
pp. 1150-1176) and not in chapter 36 (Lamotte, pp. 1329-1430) as stated by 
Hurvitz (p. 207). The Ta chih tu lun explains that the objects of the smjrtyupasthdnas 
are the ten material dyatanas and a small part of the dharmdyatana (i.e., the 
auijttapti) cf. Lamotte, p. 1170, n. 2). The same topic is treated in 11 according 
to which the specific characteristics (svalakfandni) are the ten material dyatanas 
and a small section of the dharmdyatana which is rupa (p. 848016). Hurvitz 
translates: “By the former [i.e., svalakfandni] are meant part of the ten rupdyatanas 
and the dharmdyatana*1 (p. 235).
Willemen’s translation of DharmaM’s Abhidharmahrdaya was published 
in 1975. Probably Hurvitz was able to see this excellent work only after having 
submitted his paper. Willemen’s work shows how Chinese Abhidharma texts 
are to be translated whereas Hurvitz’s article shows how they are not to be 
translated. Recently Mrs. I. Armelin published a French translation of the 
Abhidharmahfdaya: Le coewr de la lai suprime (Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1978) 
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which I have not yet read. I hope to be able to report on both translations in 
a future issue of The Eastern Buddhist.
The long delay in the publication of this volume has not prevented the 
presence of a great number of misprints. Particularly annoying are the tran­
scription errors in Sanskrit and Tibetan words, which abound in several of the 
articles. However, one would gladly accept these imperfections if the contents 
of this volume were more satisfactory. According to the introduction “these 
studies and essays are representative of the work of modem Buddhist scholar­
ship.” Happily enough, this is not the case. Let us hope that they are not even 
representative of Buddhist scholarship in the United States!
J. W. db Jong.
THE UNKNOWN CRAFTSMAN: A Japanese Insight into Beauty. By 
Yanagi Sdetsu Adapted by Bernard Leach. Kodansha International 
Ltd., Tokyo, 1977. 230 pp.
This book is not really a book: it is a voice crying out in the wilderness of our 
technotronic time, and its voice is actually the composite one of a remarkable 
trio of friends: Yanagi, and two great potters, Bernard Leach and Hamada 
Shoji. And yet, it is a book, and a beautiful one, with 76 full pages of reproduc­
tions of the finest samples of folk art Yanagi Sdetsu (1889-1961) could find, 
from Gothic English earthenware, via the Kizaemon Ido tea-bowl of 16th 
century Korea, via textiles, Sung ceramics and Egyptian Coptic as well as 
Okinawa textiles, Japanese lacquered masks and raw-lacquered wooden 
objects from Korea, to iron kettles from Northern Honshu.
The text? I read it with profound emotion because of its truthfulness, 
simplicity and deep concern with the disappearance of beauty, and even the 
taste for beauty, from contemporary life, the impoverishment of our environment, 
the decadence of our handcrafts obliterated by the over-production of shoddy 
machine products, designed by designers who are either incompetent or 
overruled by industrialists who see nothing but profit as important.
In his introduction Hamada begins with an indictment-in-a-nutshell, as sad 
as it is true, of the self-assertive art of our time, “often abstract in character and 
clearly showing the pressures of present-day life and art: I felt a general lack 
of maturity both in motivation and technique. The first impression was one of 
power, of force, but it was followed by a sensation of violence and at the same 
time of emptiness. On the whole the Japanese exhibits had a greater traditional 
content and were more skillful in technique, but were less alive . . . Shells 
without fish. The abstract examples were mannered and did not spring from a 
genuine internal life.”
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